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ABSTRACT: The aim of our paper is to offer a reading of the systemic significance of Hegel’s
inclusion of the concept of the sign in the ‘Psychology’ of his  Philosophy of Mind. We hope to
explain why it is that the Hegelian system positions a specific form of sign, the meaningless
utterance, at the point of Mind’s transition from ‘mechanical memory’ to ‘Thinking’. Rather
than  analyse  the  subtle  advancements  in  the  unfolding  of  the  self-determining  activity  of
‘Theoretical Mind’, our strategy will be to focus attention on what we take to be some central
aspects of the philosophical system’s wider developmental logic and of the general treatment of
language in speculative philosophy.  We do this by arguing that, according to Hegel’s  Logic,
language provides the element in which persons are drawn together out of their independent
subjectivity  into  a  unity  that  gives  expression  to their  universal  nature  as  in  process  and,
ultimately,  as a project to be realized.  This argument is  supplemented by a reading of the
general nature of the movement of Spirit  within Hegel’s  system that draws attention to the
significance of what we call ‘the absolute potentiality’ of Spirit. We argue that the transition
from Mechanical Memory to ‘Thinking’ relies upon the activity of producing the meaningless
utterance because this product of Mind reveals its universal nature to be its essential unity with
its object. This transition allows us to show how Mind must be understood to return to itself
out  of  its  self-loss  in  Mechanical  Memory.  Finally  we  argue  that  the  production  of  the
meaningless utterance fulfils  the requirement of reformulating the elementary  idea of Spirit
through an incorporation of the naturalness of the natural. 
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of our paper is to offer a reading of the systemic significance of Hegel’s
inclusion of the concept of the sign in the ‘Psychology’ of his  Philosophy of Mind.1 We
1 Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences 1830, (text translated by W. Wallace and Zusätze
(Hereafter ‘Z’) translated by A.V. Miller) Oxford, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1985. All references to this text
will be abbreviated as ‘PhM’. All other references to Hegel’s work are drawn from the following texts and
abbreviated as indicated.  Science of Logic (translated by A.V. Miller) Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press,
1990, abbreviated as ‘SL’. Logic: Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences 1830, (translated by W.
Wallace), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, abbreviated as ‘EL’. Phenomenology of Spirit (translated by A.V.
Miller) Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977, abbreviated as ‘PhS’.  Philosophy of Nature:  Part  One of the
Encyclopaedia of the  Philosophical  Sciences 1830 (translated by A.V. Miller)  Oxford, Clarendon Press,  1970,
abbreviated as ‘PhN’.  Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Part 1 (translated by E.S. Haldane) Lincoln and
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hope to explain why it is that the Hegelian system positions a specific form of sign, the
meaningless utterance, at the point of Mind’s transition from ‘mechanical memory’ to
‘Thinking’. Rather than analyse the subtle advancements in the unfolding of the self-
determining activity of ‘Theoretical Mind’, our strategy will be to focus attention on
what  we  take  to  be  some  central  aspects  of  the  philosophical  system’s  wider
developmental  logic  and  of  the  general  treatment  of  language  in  speculative
philosophy.2 
In section 1 we advance one substantive and one methodological claim. Firstly, we
argue that, according to Hegel’s Logic, language provides the element in which persons
are  drawn together  out  of  their  independent  subjectivity  into  a  unity  that  gives
expression to their universal nature as in process and, ultimately, as a project to be
realized. Secondly, we suggest an account of the general function of language should
inform but should not be reduced to Hegel’s account of the sign in the Psychology. In
section 2 we offer a reading of the general nature of the movement of Spirit within
Hegel’s system that draws attention to the significance of what we call ‘the absolute
potentiality’ of Spirit. In sections 3 and 4 we argue that the transition from Mechanical
Memory to ‘Thinking’ relies upon the activity of producing the meaningless utterance
because this product of Mind reveals its universal nature to be its essential unity with its
object. Section 3 spells out the sense in which Mind must be understood to return to
itself out of its self-loss in Mechanical Memory. Section 4 argues that the production of
the meaningless utterance fulfils the requirement of reformulating the elementary idea
of Spirit through an incorporation of the naturalness of the natural.
I  READING HEGEL ON LANGUAGE
Within Hegel’s system an account of the principle or general function of language is
to be found in the Logic. According to the  Science of  Logic,  in the world of spiritual
relations chemically  interacting objects,  such as  persons (SL p. 728) find their  ‘real
possibility’ in language. The ‘sign in general, and more precisely language,’ functions as
‘the theoretical element of the concrete existence of chemical objects, of their process and
its  result.’  This  is  ‘a  formal  element  having  an  existence  distinct  from them—the
element of communication in which they enter into external community with each other’ (SL
p. 729). 
London, University of Nebraska Press, 1995, abbreviated as ‘LHPh’.
2 The exploration of this question can serve very different wider interests in the philosophical system about
which our paper remains silent. W. A. de Vries takes us through a systematic elaboration of the different
forms of mental activity  (Hegel’s theory of Mental Activity, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1988).
Even so, his analysis of Mechanical  Memory only explains the transition to ‘Thinking’ in terms of the
rather general observation that the emergence of words calls for their systematisation by Thought (p.163).
On the other hand, J. McCumber ‘s extensive reading of the constitution of ‘names as such’ in Mechanical
Memory shows them to be a medium suited to the system’s need for self-expression (The Company of Words:
Hegel, Language and Systematic Philosophy, Illinois, Northwestern University press, 1993, pp. 229-241).
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This  account  of  language  appears in  the  categorial  development  of  Chemical
Objectivity.  ‘Objectivity’  signifies  the  absolute  being  of  the  Notion.  It  is  a
developmental cycle in which the objective Notion determines its subjective form in
and through its absolute being (SL p. 597). Here, the Notion that, having established
itself to be the essence of its object, submerges itself in the object in order to reach a
point  at  which  it  determines  its  object  as  its  own  end  or  purpose  (‘Teleology’).
‘Chemism’  accounts  for  the  logical  structure  out  of  which  teleological  self-
determination emerges. This structure deals with the activity of chemically interacting
objects understood as objects specifically distinguished (a) as opposed in virtue of their
differentiated essence and (b) as indifferent to each other’s essence.  
In the chemical process the activity of chemically combining objects manifests their
universal essence as a result of the sublation of their specific determinateness. But this
process  of  interaction also  produces  their  differentiation  and  return  to  their  self-
subsistence.  Accordingly,  their  universal  essence  still  has  the  form  of  an  external
relation, albeit in an absolute being. Objectivity in the form of the chemical process
thus  makes  possible  the  reality  of  formal  communication  (of  combination  and
differentiation) between beings whose absolute substantial unity is manifested in, but
not determined by, the communication process. The self-determination of the process
becomes an end to be realized. The chemical process thus results in the emergence of
the teleological object.
What  can the above structure of  logical  relations tell  us  about  the function of
language? In what sense  is  language  the  ‘real  possibility’  of  chemically  interacting
objects, such as persons? To begin with, we can read the above-cited reference to ‘the
concrete  existence  of  chemical  objects’,  as  including reference  to  particular beings
existing  within  the  absolute  being of  the  whole that  Hegel’s  philosophical  system
formulates  as  the ethical state.  It  is  here that  persons  who are constituted as  such
particular beings come to realise their humanity in the sense of being ‘in an achieved
community of minds’ (PhS p. 43). Following the logic of chemically interacting objects
we can say that, acting as speaking subjects, persons negate their self-subsistent being
without, however, losing their capability of returning to their self-subsistence. At the
same  time,  this  process  gives  their  universality—their  essential  unity  of  being—
objectivity,  albeit  only  on a formal level.  As a  formal element language provides  the
framework of  interaction  in  the  form  of  communication  that  is,  nevertheless,  still
external in the sense that it, itself, does not produce an absolute unity of being as a
substantial bond. Instead, the  external community of minds that can be achieved in the
element of formal communication inevitably points to a project. The gap between the
formality of persons-in-communication and their substantial-unity-of-being ensures that
their interacting activity is taken to be a process that needs to become their project or
end. So, for Hegel, the medium of language is ‘the real possibility’ of persons in that it
positions speaking subjects as teleological beings in the above sense.  
We will return below to the significance of this understanding of language as fore-
grounding  the  teleological  being  of  subjectivity.  For  now,  we  want  to  make  a
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methodological point that will form part of the assumed background of our discussion
of Hegel’s treatment of the sign in the Philosophy of Mind. Our point is that whilst it may
be very illuminating to bring together in a discussion of Hegel’s theory of language the
various references to language and linguistic entities that are to be found in different
parts of his system, from the point of view of reading their systemic significance, it is
unhelpful to read Hegel’s general theory of the sign or language through a selective
interpretation of any one aspect of this theory.  
We can illustrate this point be reference to Derrida’s treatment of Hegel’s theory of
the sign in  ‘The Pit  and the Pyramid:   Introduction to  Hegel’s  Semiology’.3 Here
Derrida is concerned to expose the nature of the systemic determination of the concept
of the sign and he also introduces his discussion of Hegel’s theory of language by citing
the passage from the Science of Logic that we discuss above. Yet he interprets this passage
mainly by reference to an analysis of the references to the sign in the ‘Psychology’ on
the ground that the Hegelian system develops its theory of the sign in the Philosophy of
Mind (Derrida, p. 74). Not surprisingly, having located the system’s theory of the sign in
‘the science of the subject’ and, hence, as ‘part of the essential structure of the Idea’s
return to self-presence’ (Derrida, p. 76), Derrida is then in a position to show how this
treatment of the sign as part of the Psychology of Mind subordinates the sign to Mind’s
interest in manifesting the freedom of spirit, something that goes hand in hand with the
privileging of speech over writing (Derrida, p. 86).  
Derrida’s analysis of Hegel’s ‘theory of the sign’ through the Philosophy of Mind leads
him to read the question of the systemic determination of the concept of the sign as a
question about its constitution ‘as the site of the transition’, the bridge between two
moments of full presence’ (Derrida, p. 71). His question seems all the more appropriate
because he does not take into account the claims of the passage from the Science of Logic
that he cites. As we argued above, there, far from being constituted as the mere site of
transition, language is connected to the elaboration of the objective universality of an
absolute being, albeit as its process.  
Unlike Derrida, we think that it is important not to credit Hegel’s references to the
sign in the ‘Psychology’ with attempting to do more than their positioning in the system
would suggest  is  their  purpose. Our  discussion of  their  significance  will  take  into
account that this material deals specifically with the activity and result of sign producing by
the Subject, as distinct from offering us a more comprehensive theory of the sign within
the language system.  The ‘Psychology’  is,  of  course,  a  developmental  stage  of  the
system that precedes the elaboration of the ‘Ethical state’ in relation to which we have
discussed the principle or general function of language above. As such, we treat the
Subject’s sign creating activity as an earlier, more abstract moment in the elaboration
of the Idea. This means that, from the point of view of a systemic reading, it deals with
no more than one elementary aspect of the concept of the sign whose significance is
best understood in the light of an appreciation of the wider purpose played by the
3 Margins of Philosophy (translated by A. Bass) Sussex, The Harvester Press, 1986, pp.69-108.
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Philosophy of Mind in Hegel’s system. We turn to a discussion of this purpose next.
II  THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND IN PHILOSOPHY AS THE WORLD’S SELF-
KNOWLEDGE
As the last  stage  of  Hegel’s  philosophical system,  the  Philosophy  of  Mind brings
speculative philosophy to its end as ‘the achieved notion of the whole’. But this end,
according to Hegel, is still not ‘a complete actuality’ in that it is not ‘the whole itself’
(PhS Pref. ¶ 12).  
So, in its non-identity with the whole, ‘the notion of the whole’ remains incomplete.
This incompleteness is a characteristic of philosophy that is ‘in the spirit of its time’.
Hegel credits such philosophy with producing ‘a new form of development’. This is a
‘new philosophy’ that also constitutes ‘the inward birth-place of the spirit that will later
arrive at actual form’ (LHPh, p. 55). Speculative philosophy is distinguished as ‘the
birth-place’ of the notion of spirit’s absolute self-determination.    
The ‘new form of development’ to which Hegel refers is the product of philosophy’s
‘actual difference’ from ‘that which is’:
In as far  as Philosophy is  in the spirit  of its  time, the latter is  its determined
content in the world, although as knowledge, [“as the thought and knowledge of
that which is the substantial spirit of its time”] Philosophy is above it, since it
places it in the relation of object. But this is in form alone, for Philosophy really
has no other content. This knowledge itself undoubtedly is the actuality of Mind,
the self-knowledge of Mind which previously was not present: thus the formal
difference is also a real and actual difference. Through knowledge, Mind makes
manifest a distinction between knowledge and that which is; this knowledge is
thus what produces a new form of development.  The new forms at first are only
special  modes of knowledge, and it is thus that a new philosophy is produced
(LHPh pp. 54-55).   
Because in speculative philosophy Mind is absolute, its self-knowledge treats the world,
not as an object opposed to it, but as the object for which Mind’s self-recognition is the
notion or principle. The world is here understood as the object that encompasses its
notion and is encompassed by it. However, this mutual encompassing takes a form that
denies  concrete  embodiment  to  the  notion.  For  historical  reasons,  the  spirit  of
modernity finds itself in the element of its pure self-awareness, or unconditional self-
relation, at the same time as having a being that does not embody its notion. In other
words, what we have here is a negative whole that brings together notion and reality, or
thought and being,  as  ‘absolute  otherness’.  This is  why in  speculative  philosophy,
Mind’s self-knowledge is, according to Hegel, the outcome of ‘pure self-recognition in
absolute otherness’ (PhS Pref. ¶ 26).4
4 For further discussion see T. Nicolacopoulos and G. Vassilacopoulos, Hegel and the Logical Structure of Love:
An Essay on Sexualities, Family and the Law, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999, Chapters 2 and 3.
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This  absolute  otherness  is  best  understood  in  terms  of  what  we  might  call
unconditional  or  absolute  potentiality.  We  use  the  term  ‘potentiality’  here  to
characterise the world in its negative moment in order to highlight its teleological drive.
That is, what we have here is a form of the whole in which the mutual referring of its
two aspects—notion (thought) and object (being)—creates a dynamism that at once
sustains their difference whilst moving towards its overcoming. It is worth noting that
what we are referring to is not a mere potentiality in the sense of something that has not
yet come into actual existence. By ‘absolute potentiality’ we mean to highlight that
which Hegel has in mind when he speaks, by way of contrast, of ‘the power of free
spirit’ (PhN § 376 Z).
The teleological drive of the whole in its negative moment is to be found in both
aspects of the whole, in philosophical thought and in the being of the world itself in so
far as the latter is an historical entity. As philosophical thought that is the world’s self-
knowledge, the notion achieves the form (though not the actual being) of absolute unity
with its  being. This process of conceptual self-determination results in a coming to
know the world as the teleological  object,  that is,  the being whose purpose it  is  to
embody the notion. For these reasons, in the Science of Logic—where the idea of ‘pure-
self recognition in absolute otherness’ is worked out in the element of pure thought—
the concept of purpose plays a fundamental role in the transition to ‘Absolute Idea’, as
does the concept of history in the Philosophy of Mind when that developmental movement
leads to ‘Absolute Mind’.
Within  Hegel’s  philosophical  system  the  abovementioned  self-knowledge  first
emerges explicitly in the Philosophy of Mind, since it is at this stage of the notion’s self-
determination that spirit determines itself as an absolute potentiality in the above sense.
That  is,  being  undergoes  a  developmental  process  in  the  Philosophy  of  Mind that
determines its philosophical form, or produces the self-knowledge of being, as that of its
potential unity with its notion, that is, with ‘the achieved notion of the whole’.  
Hegel characterises this developmental process as ‘the science of the Idea come
back to itself out of that otherness’. The ‘otherness’ at issue here, or more precisely, ‘the
science of the Idea in its otherness’, is articulated as the Philosophy of Nature that follows
the Logic, ‘the science of the Idea in and for itself’ (EL § 18). The Idea’s return to itself is
a return out of Nature that ‘is spirit estranged from itself’ (PhN § 247 Z) and, hence, as
the other of spirit, is ‘indifferent subsistence’ (PhN § 248). In its return to itself as Mind,
‘the Idea has asserted a being of its own, and is on the way of becoming absolute’ in the
sense that it has shown itself to be the truth of being in Nature and is therefore in a
position  to  determine  its  ‘proper  being’  (EL  §  18).  This  self-determination  brings
together the existential  element of Nature with the notion of absolute being whose
abstract form has been worked out in the Logic. If this reading is correct,  then the
development of the  Philosophy of  Mind should reveal both the logical categories  that
govern the structure of its movement and the incorporation of the natural element as
COSMOS AND HISTORY 23
part of this movement.5
III  THE ‘PSYCHOLOGY’ AND SIGN PRODUCING ACTIVITY
Within the Philosophy of Mind, ‘Psychology’ is the last stage of ‘Mind Subjective’ in
which Spirit ‘has the ideal totality of the Idea—i.e. it has before it all that its notion
contains:  its  being is  to be self-contained and free’  (PhM § 385).  The ‘Psychology’
completes this developmental cycle because in it Mind is ‘Mind defining itself in itself,
as an independent subject’ (PhM § 387). It begins with Spirit as the independent subject
that has emerged out of the phenomenological process as the differentiated unity of
subject  and  object.  Although  one  might  have  expected  Spirit  to  develop  itself  in
precisely this determination immediately following the completion of the  Philosophy of
Nature given that  the elementary idea  of  Spirit  emerges  at  this point,  the first  two
developmental cycles of the Subjective Mind, ‘Anthropology’ and ‘Phenomenology’,
play an indispensable justificatory role. Through them Spirit justifies its independence,
in the sense of determining itself as such, immanently to Spirit. More precisely, given
that Spirit is a differentiated unity, in order to develop itself in this element, it must first
demonstrate that this differentiated unity is the truth of unity, as this is constructed in
the ‘Anthropology’, and of difference, as this is constructed in the ‘Phenomenology’.  
With the emergence of the notion of universal self-consciousness at the end of the
‘Phenomenology’,  Spirit is in a position to move beyond its subjectivity and give an
account  of  itself  as  the  differentiated  unity  of  subject  and object  that  Hegel  calls
‘Reason’ (PhM § 438). The development of Reason as this totality is achieved in its
ideal form in the ‘Psychology’ that begins with ‘Theoretical Mind’. According to Hegel,
in ‘Theoretical Mind’ Spirit moves from a state of total self-loss (‘Intuition’) to a state of
self-presence (‘Thinking’) through a reflective process that transforms the ‘seemingly
objective’ object and gives it a subjective form by making it explicitly a product of Mind
(PhM § 443 and § 443Z). This alteration of the object’s form takes place via a series of
mental operations that progressively overcome the Subject’s dependence on sensuous
experience as the material of Mind. It emerges as the result of ‘mechanical memory’
that produces the sign in the form of the meaningless utterance. We want to advance
three claims in the light of our discussion in the previous sections. The first is that the
self-loss from which ‘Theoretical Mind’ proceeds calls for an incorporation of nature.
Second the transition to ‘Thinking’ requires an incorporation of what we might call ‘the
naturalness of the natural’. Our third claim is that sign-producing activity that takes the
form of generating meaningless utterances plays precisely this role, consistently with the
general function that the system attributes to language. The remainder of this section
deals with the first claim and we complete our argument in the final section.
So  why  does  the  self-loss  from which  ‘Theoretical  Mind’  proceeds  call  for  an
incorporation of nature? Mind proceeds from its self-loss because this is the immediate
5 For an account of the relations between the logical and real philosophical categories of the system see
Nicolacopoulos and Vassilacopoulos,  Chapter 6
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result of its being at once a totality—the differentiated unity of subject and object that
we mentioned above—and in  need of  determining itself  as  this  totality  in  its  own
element. In its progressive liberation from this state of self-loss, Mind must therefore
reformulate its elementary idea and, as we argued in section 2, this goes hand in hand
with an incorporation of nature.
In the self-development of Mind such an incorporation of nature becomes explicit
when Mind  determines  its  ‘Universal  self-consciousness’  in  the  ‘Phenomenology of
Mind’. Here the natural element emerges in Hegel’s account of the process of mutual
recognition as the self’s ‘negation of its immediacy and appetite’ (PhM § 436). This is
what Hegel has in mind when he characterises the selves of  such mutually related
subjects in terms of their ‘absolutely impenetrable’ self-subsistence (PhM § 436 Z). Still,
in  the ‘Phenomenology’,  as in the ‘Anthropology’,  Mind’s  self-loss is  relative  to its
respective moments of unity or of difference.  
In contrast, Mechanical Memory supplies Mind with the element out of which to
move to  its  full  self-presence as Thinking.  So,  in what sense can Mind be said  to
overcome its self-loss in Mechanical Memory? Since loss belongs to Mind, to overcome
its loss must mean that the element of its loss is transformed into a form of self-expression.
That is, whereas Mind can be said to generate different forms of its self-loss throughout
the movement from ‘Intuition’ to ‘Mechanical Memory’,  it is only in the latter that
Mind returns to itself out of its self-loss in the sense of explicitly mediating its self-loss.
Whereas in its earlier developmental form, as Intuition, Mind’s self-loss is a matter of
being lost in the apparent givenness of an external object so that its essential unity with
its object is only implicit, as we hope to show below, in Mechanical Memory Mind’s
mediation of its self-loss produces Mind’s very inwardness as a result and this return to
its inward being is a turn to Thinking. We turn finally to an elaboration of this process.
IV  MECHANICAL MEMORY AND THE MEANINGLESS UTTERANCE
According to the reading we are advancing, Mind’s self-determination as inward
must involve it in a reformulation of the elementary idea of Spirit that in turn calls for
an  incorporation  of  the  natural  element  in  an  appropriate  form.  In  Mechanical
Memory,  Hegel  tells  us, the being of  Mind as  intelligence is  transformed into ‘the
universal space of names as such’. In this form of identification of its being with that of
the sign in the form of the meaningless word, intelligence manifests itself as a being
whose  ‘power  is  a  merely  abstract  subjectivity’  (PhM  §  463).  This  power  is  the
elementary  form  of  Spirit  that  we  analysed  in  section 2  in  terms  of  an  absolute
potentiality. There we argued that Spirit is an absolute potentiality in the sense of the
power that: (a) is generated by the difference between the notion of the whole as a unity
of subject and object and its being; and (b) gives rise to teleological movement. So, in
Mechanical Memory the elementary idea of Spirit is reformulated as the self-presence
of the ‘merely abstract subjectivity’.  
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Now, in this form the being of subjectivity is identical with that of the sign that it
produces because,  as  Hegel  makes  clear, a  distinctive  characteristic  of  the sign,  in
comparison with other representational entities, is the arbitrariness of the connection
between  the  representation and  the  ‘sensuous material’  (PhM  §  457).  The sign is
therefore an existent whose being is  Mind’s  own product  (PhM § 462).  Further, in
Mechanical Memory the object in question is  a linguistic sign, rather  than a non-
linguistic sign, because language foregrounds the teleological being of subjectivity in the
sense we analysed in section 1. So, in this reformulation of the elementary idea of Spirit,
the movement of Spirit towards its end is made possible via its relation to the linguistic
sign.  
This said we have still  to  explain  why  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  meaningless
utterance renders it a suitable object for manifesting an appropriate incorporation of
nature  at  this  point  of  Mind’s  self-development.  First,  the meaningless  word  is  an
indifferent  thing,  like the indifferent  subsistence  that  characterises  the categories  of
Nature in giving expression to Spirit’s self-estrangement. However, unlike the categories
of Nature it is the absolutely indifferent. Mind produces the meaningless word as a
thing with no connection whatever to meaning and, hence, in its difference from Mind,
the word is completely devoid of Spirit, as distinct from having Spirit submerged in it.
The absence of Spirit as Notion is what makes the natural distinctively natural. The
meaningless word thus constitutes the object of Mind at this point in its development
because it gives expression to the naturalness of the natural. This expression brings out
the object’s absolute dependence on the power of the Subject. This is why Hegel refers
to the meaningless word as ‘an unresisting element’ (PhM § 444Z).   
A second feature of the meaningless utterance to which Hegel draws attention is the
fact  that it vanishes. This feature makes the meaningless utterance a suitable object
because it makes explicit the fact of the Subject’s non-dependence on the being of an
external existent. That is, in producing the sound that is completed in its vanishing
Mind produces an object into whose being it is not capable of being absorbed. Instead
it produces an object whose being necessarily returns Mind to itself as the universal
space in which Mind’s sound-generating activity takes place as its very own. Indeed, it
is  this activity of verbalizing a series  of  meaningless sounds that  makes explicit the
Subject’s  power to produce meaning given that the object  is thus produced as that
which is capable of receiving meaning (PhM § 464).  
These  features  of  the  relationship of  the Subject  to  its  object,  the  meaningless
utterance, result in the identification of the object with the Subject and, hence, in the
Subject’s complete inwardization as the unity of subject and object. In producing the
subject-object relationship in this form the activity of Mind as Mechanical Memory also
makes explicit the universal form of Mind as an  essential unity. Even though Mind’s
thinking activity implicitly constitutes an essential unity throughout the developmental
process of  ‘Theoretical Mind’,  whether immediately or  in the form of  an external
relation to its object, in Mechanical Memory Mind explicitly mediates its self-loss by
engaging in activity  that  reveals it  to be the power to produce meaning. This self-
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determination grounds the transition to ‘Thinking’, a transition that is made possible
through the inclusion in Mind’s developmental process of a certain form of linguistic
entity.
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